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Can environmental insurance succeed where other strategies fail? the case of underground storage tanks

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
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005  20110215102502.0
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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20110002428‎$a‎Yin, Haitao
24500‎$a‎Can environmental insurance succeed where other strategies fail? the case of underground storage tanks‎$c‎Haitao Yin, Alex Pfaff and Howard Kunreuther
520  ‎$a‎Private risk reduction will be socially efficient only when firms are liable for all the damage that they cause. We find that environmental insurance can achieve social efficiency even when two traditional policy instruments-ex post fines an dris management mandates with ex ante fines-do not. Inefficiency occurs with ex post fines, when small firms declare bankruptcy and escape their liabilities, limiting the incentives from this policy tool. Firms ignore mandates to implement efficient risk management because regulatroy agencies do not have sufficient resources to monitor every firm.
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080591182‎$a‎Gerencia de riesgos
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080588953‎$a‎Análisis de riesgos
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080615284‎$a‎Riesgos medioambientales
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080636692‎$a‎Seguro de responsabilidad civil por daños al medio ambiente
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20110002404‎$a‎Pfaff, Alex
700  ‎$0‎MAPA20100041284‎$a‎Kunreuther, Howard
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000345‎$t‎Risk analysis : an international journal‎$d‎McLean, Virginia : Society for Risk Analysis, 1987-2015‎$x‎0272-4332‎$g‎Tomo 31 Número 1 - 2011