Earnings smoothing, executive compensation, and corporate governance : evidence from the property-liability insurance industry
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<subfield code="a">Earnings smoothing, executive compensation, and corporate governance</subfield>
<subfield code="b">: evidence from the property-liability insurance industry</subfield>
<subfield code="c">David L. Eckles... [et al.]</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Unlike studies that estimate managerial bias, we utilize a direct measure of managerial bias in the U.S. insurance industry to investigate the effects of executive compensation and corporate governance on firms' earnings management behaviors. We find managers receiving larger bonuses and stock awards tend to make reserving decisions that serve to decrease firm earnings. Moreover, we examine the monitoring effect of corporate board structures in mitigating managers' reserve manipulation practices. We find managers are more likely to manipula te reserves in the presence of particular board structures. Similar results are not found when we employ traditional estimated measures of managerial bias.</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">Eckles, David L.</subfield>
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<subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
<subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
<subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
<subfield code="g">01/09/2011 Tomo 78 Número 3 - 2011 , p. 761-790</subfield>
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