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The Social dilemma of microinsurance : a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups

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LDR  00000cam a22000004b 4500
001  MAP20130037448
003  MAP
005  20131111171408.0
008  131111s2012 che|||| ||| ||eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎34
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20130016122‎$a‎Janssens, Wendy
24514‎$a‎The Social dilemma of microinsurance‎$b‎: a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups‎$c‎Wendy Janssens and Berber Kramer
260  ‎$a‎Geneva‎$b‎International Labour Organization‎$c‎2012
4900 ‎$a‎Microinsurance paper‎$v‎22
520  ‎$a‎This paper analyzes free-riding and coordination problems in microinsurance. We model demand for health insurance in microcredit groups that typically share risk through joint liability as a social dilemma. Less risk averse clients are tempted to free-ride and forgo individual insurance while the more risk averse face a coordination problem. Group insurance binds both types to the social optimum. Microinsurance games played with microcredit clients in Tanzania confirm the free-riding hypothesis and demonstrate limited coordination failures under individual insurance. Group insurance increases demand in the games. These findings provide a potential solution for low uptake of microinsurance
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080563394‎$a‎Microseguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080618421‎$a‎Seguro colectivo de salud
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080588069‎$a‎Sistema individual
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20130016146‎$a‎Tanzania
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20130016139‎$a‎Kramer, Berber
7102 ‎$0‎MAPA20080455859‎$a‎International Labour Organization
7102 ‎$0‎MAPA20090043008‎$a‎Micro Insurance Innovation Facility
830 0‎$0‎MAPA20100040225‎$a‎Microinsurance paper‎$v‎22
856  ‎$u‎http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/mifacility/download/repaper22.pdf
856  ‎$q‎image/jpeg‎$w‎1075747‎$y‎Portada