Do insurance companies possess an informational monopoly? Empirical evidence from auto insurance

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      <subfield code="a">Do insurance companies possess an informational monopoly? Empirical evidence from auto insurance</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">This article investigates the impact of policyholder tenure on contractual relationships in nonlife insurance markets. For a sample of auto insurance policies, we find that average risk decreases with policyholder tenure, but the effect is entirely due to the impact of observable information. We reject the hypothesis that the incumbent insurer is privately learning faster about quality of their policyholders. We highlight the importance of a public signal regarding policyholders' claims experiences and suggest alternative explanations for the unconditional relationships in the data.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">02/12/2013 Volumen 80 Número 4 - diciembre 2013 , p. 1001-1026</subfield>
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