Corporate governance and risk taking : evidence from the U.K. and German insurance markets
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<subfield code="b">: evidence from the U.K. and German insurance markets</subfield>
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<subfield code="a">We analyze the impact of factors related to corporate governance (i.e., compensation, monitoring, and ownership structure) on risk taking in the insurance industry. We measure asset, product, and financial risk in insurance companies and employ a structural equation model in which corporate governance is modeled as a latent factor. Based on this model, we present empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and risk taking, considering insurers from two large European insurance markets. Higher levels of compensation, increased monitoring (more independent boards with more meetings), and more blockholders are associated with lower risk taking. Our empirical results provide justification for including factors related to corporate governance in insurance regulation</subfield>
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<subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
<subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
<subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
<subfield code="g">01/09/2014 Volumen 81 Número 3 - septiembre 2014 , p. 653-682</subfield>
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