Pesquisa de referências

Moral hazard and advantegeous selection in private disability insurance

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20180001796‎$a‎Soika, Sebastian
24510‎$a‎Moral hazard and advantegeous selection in private disability insurance‎$c‎Sebastian Soika
520  ‎$a‎We analyse asymmetric information in private long-term disability insurance. Using the elimination period as a measure of coverage, we examine the correlation between risk and coverage. Our unique data set includes both group and individual insurance. We are thus able to disentangle moral hazard and selection in individual insurance by controlling for moral hazard using group insurance. Our results provide evidence of moral hazard and advantageous selection in the individual private long-tenn disability insurance market. Thus, we provide guidelines for policymakers and insurers on the presence of asymmetric information in disability insurance and on future attempts to reduce it.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080581879‎$a‎Previsión privada
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603793‎$a‎Seguro de incapacidad
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080564049‎$a‎Riesgo moral
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080606695‎$a‎Información asimétrica
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080562144‎$a‎Discapacidad
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603786‎$a‎Seguro de dependencia
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077100215‎$t‎Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice‎$d‎Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976-‎$x‎1018-5895‎$g‎01/01/2018 Volumen 43 Número 1 - enero 2018 , p. 97-125