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Linear versus nonlinear allocation rules in risk sharing under financial faimess

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20180014338‎$a‎Schumacher, Johannes M.
24510‎$a‎Linear versus nonlinear allocation rules in risk sharing under financial faimess‎$c‎Johannes M. Schumacher
520  ‎$a‎In a risk exchange, participants trade a privately owned risk for a share in a pool. If participants agree on a valuation rule, it can be decided whether or not, according to the given rule, these trades take place at equal value. If equality of values holds for all participants, then the exchange is said to be "financially fair". It has been shown by Buhlmann and Jewell (1979) that, undermild assumptions, the constraint of financial fairness singles out a unique solution among the set of all Pareto efficient risk exchanges. In this paper, we find that an analogous statement is true if we limit ourselves to linear exchanges.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080579258‎$a‎Cálculo actuarial
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080597665‎$a‎Métodos estadísticos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080582418‎$a‎Riesgo financiero
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080625900‎$a‎Modelos de estados financieros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080591182‎$a‎Gerencia de riesgos
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000420‎$t‎Astin bulletin‎$d‎Belgium : ASTIN and AFIR Sections of the International Actuarial Association‎$x‎0515-0361‎$g‎03/09/2018 Volumen 48 Número 3 - septiembre 2018 , p. 995-1024