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What drives tort reform legislation? : an analysis of state decisions to restrict liability torts

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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20180015984‎$a‎Deng, Yiling
24510‎$a‎What drives tort reform legislation?‎$b‎: an analysis of state decisions to restrict liability torts‎$c‎Yiling Deng, George Zanjani
520  ‎$a‎This article studies the timing of state-level tort reform enactments between 1971 and 2005. Using discrete-time hazard models, we find the level of litigation activity -as measured by incurred liability insurance losses, the number of lawyers, and tort cases commenced- to be the most important and robust determinant of tort reform adoption. Political-institutional factors and regional effects -such as Republican control of the state government, single-party control of the legislature and governorship, and a (relatively) conservative political ideology among a state's Democrats- are also associated with quicker reform adoption
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080627638‎$a‎Seguro de responsabilidad civil
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080559236‎$a‎Legislación
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603588‎$a‎Responsabilidad civil
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080592059‎$a‎Modelos predictivos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080616984‎$a‎Estudios de investigación
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080607616‎$a‎Penetración del seguro
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080638337‎$a‎Estados Unidos
700  ‎$0‎MAPA20100047651‎$a‎Zanjani, George
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 959-991