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Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect

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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20190000086‎$a‎Jia, Ning
24510‎$a‎Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect‎$c‎Ning Jia, Xuesong Tang
520  ‎$a‎We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the behavior of independent directors and the effectiveness of their governance role. Using a unique data set, we find a negative relation between D&O insurance and personal board meeting attendance by independent directors and a positive relation between D&O insurance and meeting attendance by authorized representatives. Content analysis of independent director opinion reports indicates that D&O insurance encourages independent directors to behave less responsibly. Insured independent directors are also more likely to be busy. Collectively, D&O insurance reduces the effectiveness of independent directors in corporate governance
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080633790‎$a‎Seguro de responsabilidad civil patronal
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080556402‎$a‎Seguro D&O
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20100006429‎$a‎Directors and officers (insurance)
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080605742‎$a‎Directivos de empresas
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080616380‎$a‎Consejo de Administración
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080547981‎$a‎Litigios
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080562342‎$a‎Estadísticas
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20190000093‎$a‎Tang, Xuesong
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 1013-1054