Centro de Documentación de Fundación MAPFRE - Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect

MAP20190000154

Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect / Ning Jia, Xuesong Tang

Sumario: We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the behavior of independent directors and the effectiveness of their governance role. Using a unique data set, we find a negative relation between D&O insurance and personal board meeting attendance by independent directors and a positive relation between D&O insurance and meeting attendance by authorized representatives. Content analysis of independent director opinion reports indicates that D&O insurance encourages independent directors to behave less responsibly. Insured independent directors are also more likely to be busy. Collectively, D&O insurance reduces the effectiveness of independent directors in corporate governance

En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 1013-1054

1. Seguro de responsabilidad civil patronal . 2. Seguro D&O . 3. Directors and officers (insurance) . 4. Directivos de empresas . 5. Consejo de Administración . 6. Litigios . 7. Mercado de seguros . 8. Estadísticas . I. Tang, Xuesong . II. Título.