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Actuarial independence and managerial discretion

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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎213
100  ‎$0‎MAPA20170014485‎$a‎Kamiya, Shinichi
24510‎$a‎Actuarial independence and managerial discretion‎$c‎Shinichi Kamiya, Andreas Milidonis
520  ‎$a‎Appointed actuaries are responsible for estimating the largest liability on property-casualty insurance companies' balance sheet. Actuarial independence is crucial in safeguarding accurate estimates, where this independence is self-regulated by actuarial professional institutions. However, professional conflicts of interest arise when appointed actuaries also hold an officer position within the same firm, as officer actuaries also face managerial incentives. Using a sample of U.S. insurers that employ in-house appointed actuaries from 2007 to 2014, we find evidence that officer actuaries have different reserving practices than nonofficer actuaries. This difference in reserving is associated with tax shielding and earnings management incentives. Results are consistent with managerial discretion dominating actuarial independence; they are economically significant and should be of concern to regulators and professional institutions
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080549497‎$a‎Actuarios
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080605742‎$a‎Directivos de empresas
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080590567‎$a‎Empresas de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080602437‎$a‎Matemática del seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603588‎$a‎Responsabilidad civil
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080624934‎$a‎Seguro de daños patrimoniales
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080638337‎$a‎Estados Unidos
700  ‎$0‎MAPA20110023713‎$a‎Milidonis, Andreas
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 1055-1082