Medicaid and long-term care : the effects of penalizing strategic asset transfers

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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20210003189‎$a‎Liu, Junhao
24510‎$a‎Medicaid and long-term care‎$b‎: the effects of penalizing strategic asset transfers‎$c‎Junhao Liu, Anita Mukherjee
520  ‎$a‎Medicaid provides a critical source of insurance for long term care, and individuals may strategically offload assets (typically to children) to meet the means-tested eligibility requirement. In this article, we quantify the extent of such behavior using variation in the penalty for improper parent-to-child transfers induced by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. We estimate difference-indifferences models based on the hypothesis that only individuals with high levels of nursing home risk (high risk) will alter transfers because of the Act. We find that a 2-year horizon, high-risk individuals reduced transfers to children on the extensive margin by 11 percent and that the average total amount of transfers decreased by $4,860. The results hold only for coupled respondents. We also conduct a tripledifferences analysis to examine heterogeneity with financial literacy and find that even those with a low level of financial literacy responded to the penalty.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603786‎$a‎Seguro de dependencia
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080587901‎$a‎Seguro de personas
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080539344‎$a‎Niños
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080548100‎$a‎Medicaid
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080638337‎$a‎Estados Unidos
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080078904‎$a‎Mukherjee, A.
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/03/2021 Volumen 88 Número 1 - marzo 2021 , p. 53-77