The efficiency of voluntary risk classification in insurance markets

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<dc:creator>Crocker, Keith J.</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Zhu, Nan</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2021-09-11</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: It has been established that categorical discrimination based on observable characteristics such as gender, age, or ethnicity enhances efficiency. We consider a different form of risk classification when there exists a costless yet imperfectly informative test of risk type, with the test outcome unknown to the agents ex ante. We show that a voluntary risk classification in which agents are given the option to take the test always increases efficiency compared with no risk classification. Moreover, voluntary risk classification also Pareto dominates a regime of compulsory risk classification in which all agents are required to take the test.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/176561.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Riesgo</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Pérdidas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Eficiencia operacional</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Cálculo actuarial</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">The efficiency of voluntary risk classification in insurance markets</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/06/2021 Volumen 88 Número 2 - junio 2021 , p. 325-350</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
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