Centro de Documentación de Fundación MAPFRE - Asymmetric information and insurance cycles

Notas: Sumario: This paper extends the theoretical literature on underwriting cycles by assuming insurers have heterogeneous exposure to a catastrophe. Distinct from the existing literature on insurance cycles, we model optimal contracting by competitive insurers. Since losses take time to pay out, and insurers are better informed about their catastrophe exposure than external investors, catastrophes compromise the capital-raising ability of insurers by increasing asymmetric information. Capital is restricted following a catastrophe because investors do not know the catastrophe exposure of each insurer, not because of explicit costs of raising capital. Thus, insurers decide to hold less capital following a catastrophe, giving rise to the insurance cycle.

Registros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 09/05/2022 Volumen 89 Número 2 - mayo 2022 , p. 449-474Materia / lugar / evento: Mercado de seguros Información Catástrofes Outras classificações: 7

Direitos: In Copyright (InC)

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