Moral hazard in reinsurance markets

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Doherty, Neil A.</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Smetters, Kent</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2005-09-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">The articles focuses on the moral hazard in the reinsurance market, wich the authors believe might help to explain the emergence of securitized insurance instruments. The idea that insurance - and, by extension, reinsurance -might lead to moral hazard is, of course not new. This article, however, provides empirical evidence of moral hazard in the reinsurance market. They test to see if reinsurers control for moral hazard by using loss-sensitive future premiums and-or by monitoring</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/59280.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Reaseguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Riesgo moral</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos de análisis</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Asegurabilidad</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Moral hazard in reinsurance markets</dc:title>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Título: The Journal of risk and insurance</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 72, number 3, September 2005 ;  p. 375-391</dc:relation>
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