Pension regulation, firm borrowing, and investment risk
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| Tag | 1 | 2 | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000cab a2200000 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20200040033 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20201223180209.0 | ||
| 008 | 201223e20201201usa|||p |0|||b|eng d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP | ||
| 084 | $a7 | ||
| 100 | $0MAPA20200024330$aLay, Margaret J. | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aPension regulation, firm borrowing, and investment risk$cMargaret J. Lay |
| 520 | $aThis article builds a new model of capital structure and nonpension investment decisions to show that regulatory and investment incentives created by accrued pension obligations exacerbate traditional agency problems between stockholders and bondholders. The article identifies conditions under which firms with accrued pension liabilities have an incentive to choose an overly risky capital structure, invest in risky projects with negative net present value, and/or under-fund their pension accounts. | ||
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080552114$aPensiones | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080558970$aInversiones | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080591182$aGerencia de riesgos | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20180004223$aRegulación | |
| 773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g01/12/2020 Volumen 87 Número 4 - diciembre 2020 , p. 935-968 |