Earnings smoothing, executive compensation, and corporate governance : evidence from the property-liability insurance industry
Objetos digitales
| Tag | 1 | 2 | Valor |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000cab a2200000 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20110056476 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20110929130901.0 | ||
| 008 | 110926e20110901esp|||p |0|||b|spa d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP | ||
| 084 | $a20 | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | $aEarnings smoothing, executive compensation, and corporate governance$b: evidence from the property-liability insurance industry$cDavid L. Eckles... [et al.] |
| 520 | $aUnlike studies that estimate managerial bias, we utilize a direct measure of managerial bias in the U.S. insurance industry to investigate the effects of executive compensation and corporate governance on firms' earnings management behaviors. We find managers receiving larger bonuses and stock awards tend to make reserving decisions that serve to decrease firm earnings. Moreover, we examine the monitoring effect of corporate board structures in mitigating managers' reserve manipulation practices. We find managers are more likely to manipula te reserves in the presence of particular board structures. Similar results are not found when we employ traditional estimated measures of managerial bias. | ||
| 650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080586294$aMercado de seguros | |
| 650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080590567$aEmpresas de seguros | |
| 650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080624934$aSeguro de daños patrimoniales | |
| 650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080596880$aGobierno corporativo | |
| 650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080580438$aÉtica empresarial | |
| 650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080563240$aManipulación | |
| 650 | 1 | $0MAPA20080554774$aIncentivos | |
| 651 | 1 | $0MAPA20080638337$aEstados Unidos | |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20080648558$aEckles, David L. | |
| 773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g01/09/2011 Tomo 78 Número 3 - 2011 , p. 761-790 | |
| 856 | $qapplication/pdf$w1066806$yRecurso electrónico / electronic resource |