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Health insurance benefit mandates and firm size distribution

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
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008  180702e20180601usa|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎344.1
100  ‎$0‎MAPA20180009402‎$a‎Bailey, James
24510‎$a‎Health insurance benefit mandates and firm size distribution‎$c‎James Bailey, Douglas Webber
520  ‎$a‎By 2010, the average U.S. state had passed 37 health insurance benefit mandates (laws requiring health insurance plans to cover certain additional services). Previous work has shown that these mandates likely increase health insurance premiums, which in turn could make it more costly for firms to compensate employees. Using 19962010 data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages and a novel instrumental variables strategy, we show that there is limited evidence that mandates reduce employment. However, we find that mandates lead to a distortion in firm size, benefiting larger firms that are able to self-insure and thus exempt themselves from these state-level health insurance regulations. This distortion in firm size away from small businesses may lead to substantial decreases in productivity and economic growth
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080573867‎$a‎Seguro de salud
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080606954‎$a‎Legislación de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080581886‎$a‎Primas de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080611880‎$a‎Perspectivas del seguro
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080638337‎$a‎Estados Unidos
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20180012211‎$a‎Webber, Douglas
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/06/2018 Volumen 85 Número 2 - junio 2018 , p. 577-595