Insurance in a market for credence goods
Contenido multimedia no disponible por derechos de autor o por acceso restringido. Contacte con la institución para más información.
| Tag | 1 | 2 | Valor |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000nab a2200000 i 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20071506650 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20080418125205.0 | ||
| 007 | hzruuu---uuuu | ||
| 008 | 050426e20050301usa|||| | |00010|eng d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa | ||
| 084 | $a6 | ||
| 100 | 1 | $0MAPA20080034184$aSülzle, Kai | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aInsurance in a market for credence goods$cKai Sülzle, Achim Wambach |
| 520 | 8 | $aThis article study the impact of variations in the degree of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physician act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by pretending to perform inappropriately high treatment levels leading to over-charging patients | |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080591052$aFraude en el seguro |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080592028$aModelos de análisis |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080592042$aModelos matemáticos |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20080119171$aWambach, Achim | |
| 740 | 4 | $aThe Journal of risk and insurance | |
| 773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dOrlando$gVolume 72, number 1, March 2005 ; p. 159-176 |