Can Bonus-malus allieviate insurance fraud?

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Moreno, Ignacio</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Vázquez, Francisco J.</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Watt, Richard</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2006-03-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Traditionally, insurance companies attempt to reduce fraud via audit strategies under which clims may be investigated at some cost to the insurer, with a penalty imposed upon ensureds who are found to report claims fraudulenty. However, it is also clear that, in a multiperiod settings, bonus-malus contracts also provide an incentive against fraud</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/59767.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Contrato de seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Condiciones generales del contrato</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Matemática del seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Fraude en el seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Bonus-malus</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos actuariales</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Can Bonus-malus allieviate insurance fraud?</dc:title>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Título: The Journal of risk and insurance</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 73, number 1, March 2006 ;  p.123-151</dc:relation>
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