Can Bonus-malus allieviate insurance fraud?
Título: Can Bonus-malus allieviate insurance fraud? / Ignacio Moreno, Francisco J. Vazquez and Richard Watt
Autor: Moreno, Ignacio
Notas: Traditionally, insurance companies attempt to reduce fraud via audit strategies under which clims may be investigated at some cost to the insurer, with a penalty imposed upon ensureds who are found to report claims fraudulenty. However, it is also clear that, in a multiperiod settings, bonus-malus contracts also provide an incentive against fraud
Registros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 73, number 1, March 2006 ; p.123-151
Títulos secundarios: Título: The Journal of risk and insurance
Otras clasificaciones: 6
Derechos: In Copyright (InC): http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/