Sección: Artículos Título: Can Bonus-malus allieviate insurance fraud? / Ignacio Moreno, Francisco J. Vazquez and Richard WattAutor: Moreno, Ignacio Notas: Traditionally, insurance companies attempt to reduce fraud via audit strategies under which clims may be investigated at some cost to the insurer, with a penalty imposed upon ensureds who are found to report claims fraudulenty. However, it is also clear that, in a multiperiod settings, bonus-malus contracts also provide an incentive against fraudRegistros relacionados: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 73, number 1, March 2006 ; p.123-151Materia / lugar / evento: Contrato de seguro Condiciones generales del contrato Matemática del seguro Fraude en el seguro Bonus-malus Modelos actuariales Otros autores: Vázquez, Francisco J. Watt, Richard Títulos secundarios: Título: The Journal of risk and insuranceOtras clasificaciones: 6 Derechos: In Copyright (InC) Ver detalle del número