Analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard in the health insurance market of Iran

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<dc:creator>Haddad, GholamReza Keshavarz</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Anbaji, Mahdieh Zomorrodi</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2010</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/126663.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard in the health insurance market of Iran</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice. - Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976- = ISSN 1018-5895. - Tomo 35 Número 4  - 2010</dc:relation>
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