Pension regulation, firm borrowing, and investment risk

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      <subfield code="c">Margaret J. Lay</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">This article builds a new model of capital structure and nonpension investment decisions to show that regulatory and investment incentives created by accrued pension obligations exacerbate traditional agency problems between stockholders and bondholders. The article identifies conditions under which firms with accrued pension liabilities have an incentive to choose an overly risky capital structure, invest in risky projects with negative net present value, and/or under-fund their pension accounts.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">01/12/2020 Volumen 87 Número 4 - diciembre 2020 , p. 935-968</subfield>
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