Asymmetric information in the Home lnsurance Market

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
  <record>
    <leader>00000cab a2200000   4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20170008637</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20170405151624.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">170314e20170301esp|||p      |0|||b|spa d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">324.1</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20170003434</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Ove Aarbu, Karl</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Asymmetric information in the Home lnsurance Market</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Karl Ove Aarbu</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">We test for the presence of asymmetric information in the home insurance market on a data set containing about half a million home insurance contracts, applying several different specifications of the conditional correlation test. Unlike earlier studies, we control for private information about risk aversion by having access to detailed administrative register information at the policyholder level.Wefind robust evidence of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information may stem from adverse selection or moral hazard. To disentangle moral hazard and adverse selection, we utilize an exogenous law reform that had an effect on the insurance price. Our test shows no indication of moral hazard. </subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080624972</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Seguro multirriesgo del hogar</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080586294</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Mercado de seguros</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080579258</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Cálculo actuarial</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="w">MAP20077000727</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">01/03/2017 Volumen 84 Número 1 - marzo 2017 , p. 35-72</subfield>
    </datafield>
  </record>
</collection>