Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><modsCollection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-8.xsd">
<mods version="3.8">
<titleInfo>
<title>Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect</title>
</titleInfo>
<name type="personal" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20190000093">
<namePart>Tang, Xuesong</namePart>
<nameIdentifier>MAPA20190000093</nameIdentifier>
</name>
<typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
<genre authority="marcgt">periodical</genre>
<originInfo>
<place>
<placeTerm type="code" authority="marccountry">esp</placeTerm>
</place>
<dateIssued encoding="marc">2018</dateIssued>
<issuance>serial</issuance>
</originInfo>
<language>
<languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">spa</languageTerm>
</language>
<physicalDescription>
<form authority="marcform">print</form>
</physicalDescription>
<abstract displayLabel="Summary">We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the behavior of independent directors and the effectiveness of their governance role. Using a unique data set, we find a negative relation between D&O insurance and personal board meeting attendance by independent directors and a positive relation between D&O insurance and meeting attendance by authorized representatives. Content analysis of independent director opinion reports indicates that D&O insurance encourages independent directors to behave less responsibly. Insured independent directors are also more likely to be busy. Collectively, D&O insurance reduces the effectiveness of independent directors in corporate governance</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Ning Jia, Xuesong Tang</note>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080633790">
<topic>Seguro de responsabilidad civil patronal</topic>
</subject>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080556402">
<topic>Seguro D&O</topic>
</subject>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20100006429">
<topic>Directors and officers (insurance)</topic>
</subject>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080605742">
<topic>Directivos de empresas</topic>
</subject>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080616380">
<topic>Consejo de Administración</topic>
</subject>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080547981">
<topic>Litigios</topic>
</subject>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080586294">
<topic>Mercado de seguros</topic>
</subject>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080562342">
<topic>Estadísticas</topic>
</subject>
<classification authority="">333</classification>
<relatedItem type="host">
<titleInfo>
<title>The Journal of risk and insurance</title>
</titleInfo>
<originInfo>
<publisher>Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</publisher>
</originInfo>
<identifier type="issn">0022-4367</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077000727</identifier>
<part>
<text>03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 1013-1054</text>
</part>
</relatedItem>
<recordInfo>
<recordContentSource authority="marcorg">MAP</recordContentSource>
<recordCreationDate encoding="marc">190103</recordCreationDate>
<recordChangeDate encoding="iso8601">20190103112909.0</recordChangeDate>
<recordIdentifier source="MAP">MAP20190000154</recordIdentifier>
<languageOfCataloging>
<languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">spa</languageTerm>
</languageOfCataloging>
</recordInfo>
</mods>
</modsCollection>