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Property-liability insurer reserve error : motive, manipulation, or mistake

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
MARC record
Tag12Value
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20120031159
003  MAP
005  20120710151612.0
008  120705e20120604esp|||p |0|||b|spa d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎32
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20190015554‎$a‎Grace, Martin F
24510‎$a‎Property-liability insurer reserve error‎$b‎: motive, manipulation, or mistake‎$c‎Martin F. Grace, J. Tyleer Leverty
520  ‎$a‎We use two reserve error definitions found in the literature to investigate the joint impact of previously studied incentives on the magnitude of reserve error. We find many prior conclusions are dependent upon the restricted setting in which the hypotheses are tested and on the definition of the reserve error. We find strong evidence that financially weak insurers underreserve to a greater extent than other insurers. However, our evidence casts doubt on the conclusion that insurers manipulate reserves to avoid solvency monitoring. We also find insurers increase reserves for tax purposes and to reduce the impact of regulatory rate suppression.
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080624934‎$a‎Seguro de daños patrimoniales
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080548575‎$a‎Pérdidas
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080548766‎$a‎Property
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080582340‎$a‎Reservas técnicas
700  ‎$0‎MAPA20090029347‎$a‎Leverty, J. Tyler
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎04/06/2012 Volumen 79 Número 2 - junio 2012 , p. 351-380