MAP20130037448Janssens, WendyThe Social dilemma of microinsurance : a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups / Wendy Janssens and Berber Kramer. — Geneva : International Labour Organization, 2012(Microinsurance paper ; 22)Sumario: This paper analyzes free-riding and coordination problems in microinsurance. We model demand for health insurance in microcredit groups that typically share risk through joint liability as a social dilemma. Less risk averse clients are tempted to free-ride and forgo individual insurance while the more risk averse face a coordination problem. Group insurance binds both types to the social optimum. Microinsurance games played with microcredit clients in Tanzania confirm the free-riding hypothesis and demonstrate limited coordination failures under individual insurance. Group insurance increases demand in the games. These findings provide a potential solution for low uptake of microinsurance1. Microseguros. 2. Seguro colectivo de salud. 3. Sistema individual. 4. Tanzania. I. Kramer, Berber. II. International Labour Organization. III. Micro Insurance Innovation Facility. IV. Microinsurance paper ; 22. V. Title.
