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Perceptions of randomized security schedules

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<dc:creator>Scurich, Nicholas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2014-04-07</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Security of infrastructure is a major concern. Traditional security schedules are unable to provide omnipresent coverage; consequently, adversaries can exploit predictable vulnerabilities to their advantage. Randomized security schedules, which randomly deploy security measures, overcome these limitations, but public perceptions of such schedules have not been examined. In this experiment, participants were asked to make a choice between attending a venue that employed a traditional (i.e., search everyone) or a random (i.e., a probability of being searched) security schedule. The absolute probability of detecting contraband was manipulated (i.e., 1/10, 1/4, 1/2) but equivalent between the two schedule types. In general, participants were indifferent to either security schedule, regardless of the probability of detection. The randomized schedule was deemed more convenient, but the traditional schedule was considered fairer and safer. There were no differences between traditional and random schedule in terms of perceived effectiveness or deterrence. Policy implications for the implementation and utilization of randomized schedules are discussed.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/147347.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Perceptions of randomized security schedules</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Risk analysis : an international journal. - McLean, Virginia : Society for Risk Analysis, 1987-2015 = ISSN 0272-4332. - 07/04/2014 Volumen 34 Número 4 - abril 2014 </dc:relation>
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