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Insurance, consumer search, and equilibrium price distributions

Collection: Articles
Title: Insurance, consumer search, and equilibrium price distributions / S. Nuray Akin, Brennan C. PlattAuthor: Nuray Akin, S.
Notes: Sumario: We examine a service market with two frictions: search is required to obtain price quotes, and insurance coverage for the service reduces household search effort. While fewer draws from a price distribution will directly raise a household's average price, the indirect effect of reduced search on price competition has a much greater impact, accounting for at least 89 percent of increased average expenditures. In this environment, a monopolist insurer will exacerbate the moral hazard by offering full insurance. A competitive insurance market typically results in partial insurance and significant price dispersion, yet a second-best contract would offer even less insurance coverage.Related records: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 02/06/2014 Volumen 81 Número 2 - junio 2014 Other categories: 7
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