| LDR | | | 00000cab a2200000 4500 |
| 001 | | | MAP20140025091 |
| 003 | | | MAP |
| 005 | | | 20140715151933.0 |
| 008 | | | 140714e20140602esp|||p |0|||b|spa d |
| 040 | | | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP |
| 084 | | | $a7 |
| 100 | 1 | | $0MAPA20140011889$aNuray Akin, S. |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aInsurance, consumer search, and equilibrium price distributions$cS. Nuray Akin, Brennan C. Platt |
| 520 | | | $aWe examine a service market with two frictions: search is required to obtain price quotes, and insurance coverage for the service reduces household search effort. While fewer draws from a price distribution will directly raise a household's average price, the indirect effect of reduced search on price competition has a much greater impact, accounting for at least 89 percent of increased average expenditures. In this environment, a monopolist insurer will exacerbate the moral hazard by offering full insurance. A competitive insurance market typically results in partial insurance and significant price dispersion, yet a second-best contract would offer even less insurance coverage. |
| 773 | 0 | | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g02/06/2014 Volumen 81 Número 2 - junio 2014 |
| 856 | | | $yMÁS INFORMACIÓN$umailto:centrodocumentacion@fundacionmapfre.org?subject=Consulta%20de%20una%20publicaci%C3%B3n%20&body=Necesito%20m%C3%A1s%20informaci%C3%B3n%20sobre%20este%20documento%3A%20%0A%0A%5Banote%20aqu%C3%AD%20el%20titulo%20completo%20del%20documento%20del%20que%20desea%20informaci%C3%B3n%20y%20nos%20pondremos%20en%20contacto%20con%20usted%5D%20%0A%0AGracias%20%0A |
