Collection: ArticlesTitle: Asymmetric information, self-selection, and pricing of insurance contracts : the simple no-claims case / Catherine Donnelly...[et.al]Notes: Sumario: This article presents an optional bonus-malus contract based on a priori risk classification of the underlying insurance contract. By inducing self-selection, the purchase of the bonus-malus contract can be used as a screening device. This gives an even better pricing performance than both an experience rating scheme and a classical no-claims bonus system. An application to the Danish automobile insurance market is considered.Related records: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/12/2014 Volumen 81 Número 4 - diciembre 2014 Other categories: 7Rights: In Copyright (InC)Referencias externas:
