What determines Lloyd's market syndicates' unsolicited ratings?

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<dc:creator>Shiu, Yun-Ming</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2015-04-06</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Based upon a sample of Lloyd's syndicates covering the years 20062010, we examine the determinants of (i) the likelihood of being rated and (ii) the rating that is likely to be assigned by Standard and Poor's, from which we document evidence of selectivity bias. Larger, more profitable and liquid syndicates are found to be more likely to receive a rating, and indeed, to have higher ratings. Syndicates with more reinsurance dependence are more likely to be rated, but less likely to obtain a higher rating. Our findings indicate that the signalling hypothesis dominates the uncertainty reduction theory.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/152494.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Lloyd's</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Ratios</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">What determines Lloyd's market syndicates' unsolicited ratings?</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice. - Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976- = ISSN 1018-5895. - 06/04/2015 Volumen 40 Número 2 - abril 2015 , p. 316-333</dc:relation>
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