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Self-insurance with genetic testing tools

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
MARC record
Tag12Value
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20170008644
003  MAP
005  20170405151624.0
008  170314e20170301esp|||p |0|||b|spa d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎344.1
100  ‎$0‎MAPA20170003441‎$a‎Crainich, David
24510‎$a‎Self-insurance with genetic testing tools‎$c‎David Crainich
520  ‎$a‎The development of genetic testing creates opportunities to better target disease prevention actions. In this article, we determine how the genetic information modifies self-insurance efforts in different health insurance market equilibria with adverse selection. We show that a regulation prohibiting insurers from using genetic information for rate making purposes: cancels the benefits of genetic testing when pooling equilibria occur and does not prevent the exploitation of the benefits derived from genetic testing when separating equilibria (both of the RothschildStiglitz or of the Miyazaki Spence type) prevail in insurance markets.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080547424‎$a‎Genética
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080573867‎$a‎Seguro de salud
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/03/2017 Volumen 84 Número 1 - marzo 2017 , p. 73-94