Decomposing asymmetric information in China's Automobile Insurance market

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="" xmlns:xsi="" xsi:schemaLocation="">
    <leader>00000cab a2200000   4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20180000232</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20180111134216.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">180109e20171204esp|||p      |0|||b|spa d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">322</subfield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20180000140</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Gao, Feng</subfield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Decomposing asymmetric information in China's Automobile Insurance market</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Feng Gao, Michael R. Powers, Jun Wang</subfield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Distinguishing between adverse selection and moral hazard is a difficult but important issue in insurance economics. In the present work, we model and evaluate the distinct roles of adverse selection, ex ante moral hazard, and ex post moral hazard in China¿s automobile insurance market. Our econometric analysis supports the following conclusions: (1) the effect of asymmetric information on the probability of claims is significant; (2) the effect of ex ante moral hazard on the probability of claims is not significant, establishing adverse selection as the underlying source of information asymmetry; (3) the effect of asymmetric information (including ex ante moral hazard) on the severity of claims is not significant; and (4) the impact of ex post moral hazard on claim severity is significant for a subset of lower-coverage policyholders. Consequently, it may be advisable for Chinese automobile insurance companies to allocate greater resources to both underwriting (i.e., selecting policyholders) and auditing claims. </subfield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080603779</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Seguro de automóviles</subfield>
    <datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080644178</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">China</subfield>
    <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20100058831</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Powers, Michael R.</subfield>
    <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20180000348</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Wang, Jun</subfield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="w">MAP20077000727</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">04/12/2017 Volumen 84 Número 4 - diciembre 2017 , p. 1269-1293</subfield>