Medicaid and long-term care : the effects of penalizing strategic asset transfers

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      <subfield code="a">Liu, Junhao </subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Medicaid and long-term care</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">: the effects of penalizing strategic asset transfers</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Junhao Liu, Anita Mukherjee</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Medicaid provides a critical source of insurance for long term care, and individuals may strategically offload assets (typically to children) to meet the means-tested eligibility requirement. In this article, we quantify the extent of such behavior using variation in the penalty for improper parent-to-child transfers induced by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. We estimate difference-indifferences models based on the hypothesis that only individuals with high levels of nursing home risk (high risk) will alter transfers because of the Act. We find that a 2-year horizon, high-risk individuals reduced transfers to children on the extensive margin by 11 percent and that the average total amount of transfers decreased by $4,860. The results hold only for coupled respondents. We also conduct a tripledifferences analysis to examine heterogeneity with financial literacy and find that even those with a low level of financial literacy responded to the penalty.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">01/03/2021 Volumen 88 Número 1 - marzo 2021 , p. 53-77</subfield>
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