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Insurer risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis: The role of monitoring institutional ownership
Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
MARC record
Tag12Value
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001  MAP20210022630
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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
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1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080029081‎$a‎Ma, Yu-Luen ‌
24510‎$a‎Insurer risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis: The role of monitoring institutional ownership‎$c‎Yu-Luen Ma, Yayuan Ren
520  ‎$a‎This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and insurers' risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis. Monitoring institutional investors are defined as those that have (a) a long-term investment horizon, (b) large holdings in the investee firm, (c) independence from management, and (d) a large portion of their portfolio invested in the firm. We measure both the level and persistence of monitoring institutional ownership and find a negative relationship between monitoring institutional ownership and an insurer's stock stability and performance during the crisis. Further examination reveals that these firms took more risk before the crisis. Whereas many monitoring institutions exited the insurance market after the crisis, evidence suggests that the remaining institutional investors in the postcrisis period have a longer investment horizon and are active in monitoring and risk management.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080575298‎$a‎Crisis económica ‌
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080590567‎$a‎Empresas de seguros ‌
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080545260‎$a‎Riesgos ‌
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080591182‎$a‎Gerencia de riesgos ‌
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20180012365‎$a‎Ren, Yayuan ‌
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/06/2021 Volumen 88 Número 2 - junio 2021 , p. 351-380