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Asymmetric Nash insurance bargaining between risk-averse parties

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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20260001227‎$a‎ Boonen, Tim J.
24510‎$a‎Asymmetric Nash insurance bargaining between risk-averse parties‎$c‎Tim J. Boonen and Yichun Chi
520  ‎$a‎This paper analyzes asymmetric Nash bargaining in proportional insurance contracts between a risk-averse insured and a risk-averse insurer. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which the no-insurance status quo is Pareto optimal. When this condition fails, the authors derive the corresponding optimal bargaining solution. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion for both parties, and when the insurer's initial wealth decreases with the insurable risk in reversed hazard rate order, the optimal insurance coverage and premium increase with the insured's risk aversion and the insurer's bargaining power. Additionally, if the insured exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, higher insurer initial wealth leads to greater optimal coverage
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080584290‎$a‎Contrato de seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080590468‎$a‎Economía del seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080579258‎$a‎Cálculo actuarial
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080552367‎$a‎Reaseguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080584580‎$a‎Demanda de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080581886‎$a‎Primas de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080602437‎$a‎Matemática del seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080592042‎$a‎Modelos matemáticos
700  ‎$0‎MAPA20110012106‎$a‎Chi, Yichun
7102 ‎$0‎MAPA20100017661‎$a‎International Actuarial Association
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000420‎$g‎19/01/2026 Volume 56 Issue 1 - January 2026 , p. 243 - 269‎$x‎0515-0361‎$t‎Astin bulletin‎$d‎Belgium : ASTIN and AFIR Sections of the International Actuarial Association