Insurance in a market for credence goods

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      <subfield code="a">This article study the impact of variations in the degree of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physician act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by pretending to perform inappropriately high treatment levels leading to over-charging patients</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">Volume 72, number 1, March 2005 ;  p. 159-176</subfield>
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