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The Social dilemma of microinsurance : a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Janssens, Wendy</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Kramer, Berber</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>International Labour Organization</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Micro Insurance Innovation Facility</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2012</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: This paper analyzes free-riding and coordination problems in microinsurance. We model demand for health insurance in microcredit groups that typically share risk through joint liability as a social dilemma. Less risk averse clients are tempted to free-ride and forgo individual insurance while the more risk averse face a coordination problem. Group insurance binds both types to the social optimum. Microinsurance games played with microcredit clients in Tanzania confirm the free-riding hypothesis and demonstrate limited coordination failures under individual insurance. Group insurance increases demand in the games. These findings provide a potential solution for low uptake of microinsurance</dc:description>
<dc:format xml:lang="en">image/jpeg</dc:format>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/144925.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:publisher>International Labour Organization</dc:publisher>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Microseguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro colectivo de salud</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Sistema individual</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Tanzania</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Libros</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">The Social dilemma of microinsurance : a framed field experiment on free-riding and coordination in microcredit groups</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">Microinsurance paper ; 22</dc:relation>
<dc:coverage xml:lang="es">Tanzania</dc:coverage>
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