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Dynamic moral hazard : a longitudinal examination of automobile insurance in Canada

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005  20190103114806.0
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040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎322
100  ‎$0‎MAPA20100048726‎$a‎Shi, Peng
24510‎$a‎Dynamic moral hazard‎$b‎: a longitudinal examination of automobile insurance in Canada‎$c‎Peng Shi, Wei Zhang, Jean-Philippe Boucher
520  ‎$a‎This article examines moral hazard in the context of dynamic contracting in automobile insurance. Economic theory shows that experience rating of insurers results in state dependence of driving behavior under moral hazard. The empirical analysis is performed using a longitudinal data set from a Canadian automobile insurer. We employ dynamic nonlinear panel data models to distinguish the structural and spurious state dependence, and thus moral hazard and selection on unobservables. As a measure of the riskiness of driving, we consider the frequency, the number, as well as the cost of claims for the policyholder. We find that the state dependence in claim cost reflects both structural and spurious relationships, supporting the moral hazard hypothesis. However, the state dependence in claim occurrence is solely due to unobserved heterogeneity
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603779‎$a‎Seguro de automóviles
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080564049‎$a‎Riesgo moral
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080584290‎$a‎Contrato de seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080599751‎$a‎Accidentes de tráfico
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080606695‎$a‎Información asimétrica
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080592059‎$a‎Modelos predictivos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080562342‎$a‎Estadísticas
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080637712‎$a‎Canadá
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20180015946‎$a‎Zhang, Wei
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080297572‎$a‎Boucher, Jean-Philippe
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 939-958