Tournament incentives and reserve management

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<title>Tournament incentives and reserve management</title>
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<name type="personal" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080048266">
<namePart>Lai, Gene C.</namePart>
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<namePart>American Risk and Insurance Association</namePart>
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<dateIssued encoding="marc">2025</dateIssued>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">The study examines how internal competitive incentives (tournament incentives) among vice presidents in property-liability insurance companies influence reserve management. The research shows that a larger pay gap between the CEO and the VPs leads to more conservative reserving practices, as executives seek to demonstrate financial strength to improve their promotion prospects. Unlike findings in other sectors, no positive relationship is observed between these incentives and either risk-taking or firm performance. The effect is stronger in insurers with higher return volatility or a greater proportion of reserves relative to total liabilities. In addition, the SOX regulation and stronger board oversight further reinforce conservative practices. The article provides new evidence on how internal incentives shape financial behavior within insurance companies</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Gene Lai...[et al.]</note>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080624934">
<topic>Seguro de daños patrimoniales</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080590567">
<topic>Empresas de seguros</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080582340">
<topic>Reservas técnicas</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20260000800">
<topic>Regulación financiera</topic>
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<title>Risk management & insurance review</title>
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<publisher>Malden, MA : The American Risk and Insurance Association by Blackwell Publishing, 1999-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">1098-1616</identifier>
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<text>23/12/2025 Volume 28 Issue 4 - 2025 , p. 499 - 533</text>
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