Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Contracting incentives and compensation for property-liability insurer executives

MAP20071505451

Contracting incentives and compensation for property-liability insurer executives / Elisabeth Grace

This article examines several hypotheses about the structure and level of compensation for 103 property-liability chief executive officers (CEOs) from 1995 through 1997. The greater the level of the firm risk and the larger the firm, the greater the use of incentive compensation

En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 71, number 1, March 2004 ; p. 285-307

1. Estudios . 2. Seguro de riesgo . 3. Directivos de empresas . 4. Incentivos . 5. Seguro de daños patrimoniales . 6. Análisis empírico . I. Título. II. Título: The Journal of risk and insurance.