Optimal insurance design under limited liability
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| Tag | 1 | 2 | Valor |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000cab a2200000 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20260003542 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20260211172340.0 | ||
| 008 | 260210e20251117usa|||p |0|||b|eng d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP | ||
| 084 | $a13 | ||
| 100 | $0MAPA20260002682$aBergesio, Andrea | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aOptimal insurance design under limited liability$cAndrea Bergesio, Pablo Koch-Medina and Cosimo Munari |
| 520 | $aThis article examines how insurance contracts should be structured when policyholders face limited liability. Using an expected-utility approach, it shows that full insurance is not always optimal because large losses can lead to bankruptcy, making default more attractive for the insured. The study compares general, increasing, and doubly increasing contracts and explains how limited liability reshapes incentives for coverage. It concludes that capped deductibles emerge as the optimal form under doubly increasing conditions, extending previous literature and highlighting how limited liability transforms both the design and appeal of insurance protection | ||
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080584290$aContrato de seguro | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20260000916$aCláusulas limitativas | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080558499$aFranquicias | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080588953$aAnálisis de riesgos | |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20100048641$aKoch-Medina, Pablo | |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20200010944$aMunari, Cosimo | |
| 710 | 2 | $0MAPA20080465346$aAmerican Risk and Insurance Association | |
| 773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$g17/11/2025 Volumen 92 Número 4 - noviembre 2025 , p. 1122 - 1142$x0022-4367$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- |