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Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
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1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080189150‎$a‎Crocker, Keith J.
24500‎$a‎Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection‎$c‎Keith J. Crocker, Arthur Snow
520  ‎$a‎Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the RothschildStiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible.
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080616984‎$a‎Estudios de investigación
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080553630‎$a‎Coberturas
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080584290‎$a‎Contrato de seguro
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080609788‎$a‎Comunicación del riesgo
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080619992‎$a‎Obligaciones del asegurado
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080599096‎$a‎Selección de riesgos
650 1‎$0‎MAPA20080582661‎$a‎Selección adversa
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20090003781‎$a‎Snow, Arthur
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/06/2011 Tomo 78 Número 2 - 2011