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Corporate governance and cash holdings : evidence from the U.S. property-liability insurance industry

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
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1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20150014931‎$a‎Hsu, Wen-Yen
24510‎$a‎Corporate governance and cash holdings‎$b‎: evidence from the U.S. property-liability insurance industry‎$c‎Wen-Yen Hsu, Yenyu Huang, Gene Lai
520  ‎$a‎This article examines the impact of board and finance committee characteristics on insurers' cash holdings using a sample of 1,454 U.S. stock propertyliability insurer-year observations. We focus on the roles of independent board members and independent finance committee members. Our results suggest that independent board members allow managers to hold excess cash holdings to avoid underinvestment and play a monitoring role in managers' cash spending behavior in a regulated industry. The overall findings are consistent with the independent director responsibility hypothesis, which suggests that independent directors play a monitoring role in managers' cash spending behavior and avoiding underinvestment problems.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080624934‎$a‎Seguro de daños patrimoniales
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080548766‎$a‎Property
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080551490‎$a‎Liability
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603588‎$a‎Responsabilidad civil
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080638337‎$a‎Estados Unidos
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎07/09/2015 Volumen 82 Número 3 - septiembre 2015 , p. 715-748