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Advantageous selection, moral hazard, and insurer sorting on risk in the U.S. automobile insurance market

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
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008  180702e20180601usa|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20180009396‎$a‎Robinson, Patricia A.
24510‎$a‎Advantageous selection, moral hazard, and insurer sorting on risk in the U.S. automobile insurance market‎$c‎Patricia A. Robinson, Frank A. Sloan, Lindsey M. Eldred
520  ‎$a‎This study quantifies the role of private information in automobile insurance policy choice using data on subjective beliefs, risk preference, reckless driving, the respondent's insurer, and insurance policy characteristics merged with insurer-specific quality ratings distributed by independent organizations. We find a zero correlation between ex post accident risk and insurance coverage, refiecting advantageous selection in policy choice offset by moral hazard. Advantageous selection is partly attributable to insurer sorting on consumer attributes known and used by insurers. Our analysis of insurer sorting reveals that lower-risk drivers on attributes observed by insurers obtain coverage from insurers with higher-quality ratings.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603779‎$a‎Seguro de automóviles
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080553630‎$a‎Coberturas
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080564049‎$a‎Riesgo moral
651 1‎$0‎MAPA20080638337‎$a‎Estados Unidos
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080148492‎$a‎Sloan, Frank A.
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20180012204‎$a‎Eldred, Lindsey M.
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎01/06/2018 Volumen 85 Número 2 - junio 2018 , p. 545-575