Pesquisa de referências

Inherent virtue or inevitable evil : the effects of directors' and officers' insurance on firm value

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
  <record>
    <leader>00000cab a2200000   4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20190000918</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20190111134123.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">190110e20180928esp|||p      |0|||b|spa d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">332</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20190000383</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">W. H. Fung, Derrick</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Inherent virtue or inevitable evil</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">: the effects of directors' and officers' insurance on firm value</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Derrick W. H. Fung, </subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Whether directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance improves firrn value is a controversial issue. We perform a literature review about the effect of D&O insurance and find mixed results. The proponents of D&O insurance believe it enhances corporate monitoring and improves firm value, while the opponents of D&O insurance argue that it creates a moral hazard problem and diminishes firm value. Against this backdrop, we argue that the trade-off between the monitoring and moral hazard effects depends on the information acquired by the outside directors. Using a sample of listed Canadian firms, we find that (1) a change in D&O insurance coverage has no net effect on a firm's subsequent value when we ignore the information acquired by outside directors, (2) an increase in D&O insurance coverage improves a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are well informed, and (3) an increase in D&O insurance coverage reduces a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are poorly informed. Our findings are robust to endogeneity checks and have important implications for the regulation of D&O insurance</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080633790</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Seguro de responsabilidad civil patronal</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080556402</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Seguro D&O</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080605742</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Directivos de empresas</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080564049</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Riesgo moral</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080591182</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Gerencia de riesgos</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080590567</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Empresas de seguros</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080562342</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Estadísticas</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080638337</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Estados Unidos</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="w">MAP20077001748</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">Risk management & insurance review</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Malden, MA : The American Risk and Insurance Association by Blackwell Publishing, 1999-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">1098-1616</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">28/09/2018 Tomo 21 Número 2 - 2018 , p. 243-288</subfield>
    </datafield>
  </record>
</collection>