Pesquisa de referências

Moral hazard, risk sharing, and the optimal pool size

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20190019613
003  MAP
005  20190625125338.0
008  190624e20190603usa|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎7
24500‎$a‎Moral hazard, risk sharing, and the optimal pool size‎$c‎Frauke von Bieberstein... [et al.]
300  ‎$a‎27 p.
520  ‎$a‎We examine the optimal size of risk pools with moral hazard. In risk pools, the effective share of the own loss borne is the sum of the direct share (the retention rate) and the indirect share borne as residual claimant. In a model with identical individuals with mixed risk-averse utility functions, we show that the effective share required to implement a specific effort increases in the pool size. This is a downside of larger pools as it, ceteris paribus, reduces risk sharing. However, we find that the benefit from diversifying the risk in larger pools always outweighs the downside of a higher effective share. We conclude that, absent transaction costs, the optimal pool size converges to infinity. In our basic model, we restrict attention to binary effort levels, but we show that our results extend to a model with continuous effort choice.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080591182‎$a‎Gerencia de riesgos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080625542‎$a‎Diversificación de los riesgos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20100005699‎$a‎Pools
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080564049‎$a‎Riesgo moral
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080579647‎$a‎Compartimentación
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20190008495‎$a‎Bieberstein, Frauke von
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎03/06/2019 Volumen 86 Número 2 - junio 2019 , p. 297-313