Pesquisa de referências

Feasibility of Long-Term Interest Balance among Stakeholders in the Natural Catastrophe Insurance Market

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20210024368
003  MAP
005  20210726145552.0
008  210726e20210106esp|||p |0|||b|spa d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎328.1
100  ‎$0‎MAPA20210030086‎$a‎Zhang, Ning
24510‎$a‎Feasibility of Long-Term Interest Balance among Stakeholders in the Natural Catastrophe Insurance Market‎$c‎Ning Zhang, Yang-Che Wu, Wan-Shiou Yang
520  ‎$a‎This study establishes a stakeholder framework in the natural catastrophe insurance market: Insurers charge policyholders the full insurance premium and pay the public catastrophe insurance scheme (PCIS) contributions for the contingent bailout. The government subsidizes policyholders and taxes insurers. Then a series of accounting procedures is developed to illustrate how the stakeholders' cash flows change. A numerical analysis reveals that both the PCIS and the subsidy policy can achieve long-term self-financing under special tax rates, contribution rates, and subsidy conditions. The results show that the short-term inequity of favoring insurers and policyholders can promote balanced long-term interests for all stakeholders.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080629755‎$a‎Seguro de riesgos extraordinarios
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080600204‎$a‎Catástrofes naturales
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080553241‎$a‎Asegurados
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20210030123‎$a‎Wu, Yang-Che
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20210030130‎$a‎Yang, Wan-Shiou
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000239‎$t‎North American actuarial journal‎$d‎Schaumburg : Society of Actuaries, 1997-‎$x‎1092-0277‎$g‎01/06/2021 Tomo 25 Número 2 - 2021 , p. 163-185